This paper explores the quantity discount coordination models in the fashion supply chain with uncertain yields and random\r\ndemand. The paper proves that, under the independent and noncoordinated decision patterns, there exists a Nash equilibrium\r\nbetween the supplier and the manufacturer which reduces the supply chainââ?¬â?¢s profit margin. In order to achieve the ââ?¬Å?optimalââ?¬Â\r\ncentralized supply chain expected profit margin, new quantity discount models have been established. Both the supplier-oriented\r\nand the manufacturer-oriented Stackelberg supply chain gaming models are investigated. Our analytical and numerical analyses\r\nshow that the quantity discount contract proposed in this paper can largely reduce the negative influence brought by the uncertainty\r\nof yields and demand.Therefore, the profit margin of supply chains based on quantity discount can reach the optimal level of the\r\nsupply chain under the centralized setting.
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